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COOPERATIVE CREDIT NETWORK: ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES 








“Cooperation can get started by even a small cluster of individuals who are prepared 







This  paper  provides  an  outline  of  both  the  competitive  advantages  and  challenges 
currently  faced by Italian cooperative credit banks. These banks play an important 
role for the stability of the financial system at the level of regions. They provide credit 
to individuals and households, as well as capital to SMEs. Italian cooperative credit 
banks  are  integrated  into  a  distinct  sui  generis  network,  which  grants  them  an 
adequate  level  of  competitiveness  in  the;  and  Visiting  PhD  student  market.  By 
effectively implementing democratic principles of governance and by focusing on retail 
banking, these banks foster responsible behaviour, which is crucial in times of crisis. 
This  paper  suggests  that  a  better  understanding  of  their  specifics  highlights  their 
contribution  to  sound  cooperation  in  economics.  Finally,  the  paper  provides  policy 
recommendations for a qualitative supervision of cooperative credit banks to further 
increase  the  stability  of  the  cooperative  credit  network  and,  thus,  of  the  Italian 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on mutual cooperation in banking by focusing on 
“cooperative banks” in Italy. One needs to pay particular attention to the classification 
of  such  banks.  As  an  attempt  to  evaluate  an  idiosyncratic  segment  of  the  Italian 
financial system, I apply a narrow definition of cooperative banks by focusing on their 
regulation.  I  exclude  financial  intermediaries  with  similar  voting  mechanisms,  for 
instance the so-called banche popolari which, on average, tend to be large. Instead, I 
focus specifically on the banche di credito cooperativo. In Italy, these banks play a 
vital  role  for  local  entrepreneurial  growth  and  economic  development.  In  the  last 
decades,  they  achieved  economic  success  and  are  thus  considered  an  important 
segment  of  the  national  financial  system.  Furthermore,  new  ones  have  been 
established  recently:  as  noted  by  Saccomanni  (2007),  in  the  period  from  2000  to 
2007, 30 new banks have emerged.  
 
Since cooperative credit banks are among those institutions that have shown better 
resilience to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, it is not surprising that they have gained 
increasing  attention  from  the  scholarly  community.  With  the  implementation  of 
democratic principles of governance, and by relying on traditional yet fully competitive 
intermediation  models,  they  seem  to  provide  the  best  alternative  to  standard 
commercial  banks.  They  can  be  viewed  as  complementary  to  commercial  banks. 
Cooperative credit banks are particularly important to highly industrialized and well-
performing  regions  such  as  Trentino  Alto  Adige,  Lombardia,  Veneto,  Tuscany  and 
Emilia Romagna, as well as to other regions in the North, the Centre, and the South of 
Italy.  
 
Italian cooperative credit banks relate into a well-developed commercial “network”, 
which  maintains  important  historical  roots  both  at  a  local  and  a  regional  level 
(Andruccioli and Messina, 2007, 66-67; Finocchiaro, 2007). I refer to such a network 
as  the  Italian  cooperative  credit  system.  The  concept  of  a  “system”  is  useful  for  
addressing the relationships among players that form a business unity – in our case, 
Italian  cooperative  credit  banks
1.  The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  discuss  both  the 
competitive advantages and shortcomings resulting from such a network, particularly 
with respect to corporate governance and different intermediation models in banking. 
I  argue  that  an  improvement  in  their  governance  would  further  increase  their 
economical and social benefits. I thereby wish to stimulate scholarly debate on this 
topic.  What  distinguishes  cooperative  credit  banks  from  commercial  banks?  Are 
scholars aware of such differences and of their implications for analysis? Do regulators 
and policy-makers adequately account for their specifics? These are some of the 
questions that inspire my research. I believe that they need to be answered carefully 
in order to shed light on the cooperative credit network and, thus, provide insights on 
                                                 
1In any field of science, this concept is used to understand the pattern or structure between any parts or sets. 
Usually, it is assumed that a system has an environment and, consequently, there is a requirement for boundary 
maintenance. One shall not overlook the problem of stability of networks, to be treated as an empirical question 
in scholarly research.   4 
an important segment of the Italian banking system. 
 
In this paper, I first take a broader look at the European cooperative credit banks and 
their performance during the crisis. Such an introduction helps one to obtain a better 
grasp on the Italian cooperative credit system as it enables a comparison with other 
kinds  of  banking  systems  in  Europe.  Subsequently,  I  account  for  the  competitive 
advantages that cooperative credit banks developed during the past decades. From 
the  outset,  I  should  point  out  that major  advantages  over competitors  result from 
better financial services, proximity to clients, economic benefits equally enjoyed by 
cooperative members, effective governance mechanisms and lower risks of failure. On 
the  other  hand,  by  reference  to  scholarly  research,  I  provide  a  list  of  their 
shortcomings  and  competitive  disadvantages. Although straightforward  examples  of 
mismanagement appear to be rare in Italian cooperative banking, they nonetheless 
call  for  an  effective  supervision  from  financial  authorities  and  regulators.  Such 
problem  needs  to  be  addressed  from  a  qualitative  point  of  view.  I  conclude  by 
suggesting some improvements in the regulation and supervision of these banks for 
promoting a “stable” financial system
2.   
 
2. Specifics of Italian cooperative credit banks and their governance 
 
As  on  average  most  other  European  counterparts,  Italian  cooperative  credit  banks 
showed a remarkable ability to overcome the 2007-2008 crisis and its resulting side-
effects (Groeneveld and de Vries, 2009). Additionally, interesting insights are obtained 
by reviewing their performance in the period prior to the crisis, and by comparison to 
the performance of standard commercial banks. Gutierrez (2008) for instance focuses 
on  a  number  of  performance  indicators  for  the  2004-2006  period.  Her  findings 
suggest  that  the  Italian  cooperative  banks  have  a  higher  solvency  ratio  (16.3) 
compared to standard commercial banks (11.0) as well as a higher Tier 1 ratio (15.5 
versus  8.1)
3. Results from other scholarly research confirm the soundness and the 
solidity  which  are  characteristic  of  most  cooperative  banks  operating  in  Europe 
(Gurtner et al., 2002). On the other hand, such banks on average tend to be less 
profitable than standard banks, with a ROE ratio of 7.4 compared to an average of 
10.2 of the Italian banking system.  
 
2.1 Governance: the cooperative credit network 
 
                                                 
2   The concepts of “financial stability” and “financial instability” are well-discussed by the economic 
literature. One of the best accounts can be found in Alessandro Vercelli’s essay Minsky, Keynes, and the Structural 
Instability of a Sophisticated Monetary Economy, published as a working paper by the Department of Political 
Economy at the University of Siena in March 1999. Vercelli distinguishes the everyday language use of the word 
“instability” (meaning liable to change) from the more specialised language of economics. In the domain of 
economics, one may distinguish between “dynamic” instability and “structural” instability : the latter focuses on 
structural properties of the object or phenomenon to which it refers. In defining financial (in)stability, Vercelli 
refers to the school of Andronov in mathematics (see Andronov, Vitt and Khaikins’ Theory of Oscillations, 
published in 1937).   
3   The Tier 1 ratio is a core measure of a bank’s financial strength. It is defined as the ratio of the bank’s 
core equity capital to its risk-weighted assets.    5 
Even though cooperative banks may suffer from specific sources of financial instability 
(Hesse and Cihak, 2007), an appraisal of their specifics enables scholars and policy-
makers  to  obtain  valuable  insights  for  the  design  of  a  financially  stable  system  – 
currently a major goal in financial policy at both international and national levels (FSF, 
2008; Nier, 2009). Policies accounting for the specifics of financial intermediaries in 
turn help securing social order and social cohesion. Such policies apply to the Italian 
context  particularly  well.  A  focus  on  organisational  issues  helps  one  to  design  a 
strategy accounting for the differences between cooperative credit banks on the one 
hand, and standard commercial banks on the other. It is therefore important to define 
the concept of “governance” at the outset.  
 
Broadly  defined,  it refers  to the  system by  which enterprises  or segments  of their 
businesses  are  managed  and  controlled.  While  there  are  several  definitions  for 
governance, Cadbury provides a definition that suites cooperative credit banks well: 
governance is “concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals 
and between individual and communal goals. The governance framework is there to 
encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the 
stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests 
of individuals, corporations and society” (Cadbury, 2000).  
 
It is precisely within such a framework that cooperative credit banks are successful in 
developing most of their advantages over competitors and define their raison d’etre. 
 
 


















Source: author, based on Cadbury (2000) 
 
Cadbury‟s  definition  of  governance  is  particularly  insightful.  It  refers  to  the 
multifaceted  economic  and  social  goals,  which  are  crucial  to  the  establishment  of 
cooperative enterprises and, specifically, to cooperative banks. Despite lower levels of 
profitability due to a less pronounced development policy and a more conservative 
business  model,  Italian  cooperative  credit  banks  provide  vital  credit  and  financial 
services to small enterprises and the local community (Finocchiaro, 2002; Finocchiaro, 
2007;  Tarantola,  2008;  Goglio  and  Leonardi,  2010).  They  are  well-integrated  into 
local  productive  networks  and  industrial  clusters,  which  are  widespread  in  Italy 
(Antoldi, 2006).  According to the data provided by Federcasse – the Italian federation 
of cooperative credit banks –, as of  September 30
th 2009, more than 420 cooperative   6 
credit banks operated in different Italian regions, and 993 thousand members have 
been  registered  with  Italian  cooperative  credit  banks.  As  of  the  same  date,  4,192 
cooperative  banking  branches  provided  services  to  5.7  million  customers  in  Italy. 
Furthermore,  on September 30
th  2009,  roughly  31,000  employees  were  working  in 
Italian cooperative credit banks
4.  
 
Cooperative credit banks in Italy do not operate individually  – that is, independently 
from  each  other;  conversely,  they  operate  within  a  regulatory  framework  and  a 
branch  network,  which  allows  them  the  pursuit  of  economies  of  scale  and  scope. 
Banking and credit networks can be organised either as relatively flat organisations, 
or as multi-level structures with in-between levels of regional groups or associations. 
Similarly to Spanish cooperative banks, Italian cooperative credit banks are organised 
in  networks  which  resemble  decentralised  systems  with  voluntary  integration  (Di 
Salvo, 2002; Finocchiaro, 2007; Fonteyne, 2007). For such networks to exist, banks 
that  relate  to  them  must  be  able  to  share  information  about  each  other.  Stated 
otherwise, they need to be able to sustain each other financially in times of crisis. The 
benefits  from  belonging  to  such  a  network  are  numerous.  For  example,  they  help 
achieve  a  decrease  in  transaction  costs,  reduce  uncertainty,  and  effectively 
redistribute  risks.  Next,  I  will  discuss  the  legal  framework  that  regulates    Italian 
cooperative credit banks as suggested by a number of studies, namely by Capriglione 
(1995, 92-115), Tilli (1996) and Caleffi (2006).    
 
2.2 Regulatory framework: the 1993 Italian Banking Act 
 
To develop an in-depth understanding of the Italian cooperative credit system, one 
needs to obtain a full  grasp of the regulatory framework under which these banks 
operate. The 1993 Italian Banking Act (“Testo unico delle leggi in materia bancaria e 
creditizia” – T.U.B.) accounts for the specifics of cooperative credit banks. In order to 
operate on the market, cooperative credit banks have to have at least 200 registered 
members (Art. 34); each bank needs to recover in a years‟ time if the number of 
members  falls  under  such  a  threshold.  Cooperative  credit  banks  are  heavily 
dependent on their members: in fact, they need to apply a number of “solidaristic 
principles” to their main business by providing credit primarily to members (Art. 35). 
Finally, cooperative credit banks need to register 70% of the annual net profits as 
reserves (Art. 37). Such a regulatory framework – summarised in Table 3 – has a 
number of economic implications. They are discussed below. 
 
                                                 
4 www.creditocooperativo.it. Last accessed: 18 August 2010.     7 
 
Table 2 - Regulation of cooperative credit banks 
 
ITALIAN BANKING LAW  SUBJECT  DESCRIPTION 
 
ART. 33  Limits to Shareholder 
Participation 
 
EUR 50,000 per member. 
ART. 34  Voting Rules 
 
One man, one vote 
ART. 35  Mutualistc Features  Credit is granted primarily to 
members. 
 
Regional Limits  Cooperative credit banks can 
expand to a neighbouring 
region if – and only if – they 
have at least 200 members in 
that region. 
 
ART. 36  Conversion to Joint Stock 
Company 
The bank needs to be 
liquidated in order to change 
status. What is left from 
liquidation is to be paid into 
the mutual aid fund “Fondo 
Sviluppo”. 
 
ART. 37  Profit Allocation Policy  -  70 percent of the 
annual net profits is to 
be allocated to 
reserves. 
-  3 percent of the 
annual net profits is to 
be allocated in the 
mutual aid fund 
“Fondo Sviluppo” for 




Source: Gutierrez (2008) and 1993 Italian Banking Act/T.U.B. 
 
By reference to Hesse and Cihak (2007, 18) one could argue that their ability to retain 
profits or distribute them in the form of consumer surplus provides them with greater 
stability:  “cooperative  banks  in  normal  times  pass  on  most  of  their  returns  to 
customers, but are able to recoup that surplus in weaker periods. To some extent, this 
result can also reflect the mutual support mechanism that many cooperative banks 
have created”. Furthermore, the presence of cooperative banks appears to weaken 
commercial  banks,  in  particular  those  commercial  banks  that  already  show  some 
sources  of  weakness.  Stated  otherwise,  cooperative  banks  tend  to  increase  the 
stability of the banking system in the long-run.  
 
One  of  the  major  competitive  advantages  of  the  Italian  cooperative  credit  system 
results from a mutual aid fund to which cooperative credit banks subscribe. What is 
the  specific  function  of  such  a  mutual  support  mechanism?  To  put  it  simply,  if  an   8 
individual  bank  experiences  distress  or  a  sudden  decrease  in  its  capital,  the  funds 
collected by other banks provide the means to avoid a crisis. The underperforming 
bank de facto receives funding and is eventually saved by means of the financial aid 
from  affiliated  banks:  this  stands  as  a  good  example  of what can  be  defined  as  a 
“cooperative  behaviour”  in  banking.  Cooperation  enforces  trust  among  banks  and 
other financial intermediaries. The latter is essential, for instance, in lending activities 
among  banks  themselves  and  in  all  operations  within  the  interbanking  market.  If 
coordinated  and  properly  fostered,  cooperation  does  not  impair  competition: 
conversely,  it  helps  to  ensure  a  high  level  of  fairness  among  different  players  in 
financial markets.   
 
2.3 Focus on retail banking 
 
A distinctive feature of Italian cooperative credit banks results from a well-developed 
retail business, which enables them to adequately address the financial needs of their 
cooperative  members  and  customers.  It  comes  as  no  surprise  that  they  show  an 
ability  to  meet  the  needs  of  innovative,  small-sized  and  family-owned  enterprises, 
which are typical of the Italian economy (Bianchi at al., 2005; Antoldi, 2006; Colli, 
2007; Caruso and Palmucci, 2008; Dessì and Floris, 2008). For example, one of the 
banks that initially funded the entrepreneurial efforts of the Benetton family – whose 
main  business  started  in  the  1960s  and  then  expanded  in  a  global  fashion  brand, 
thereby achieving commercial success particularly in the 1980s and 1990s – was the 
Cassa Rurale di Ponzano, namely a cooperative credit bank based in the Veneto region 
(Malvestio, 2006, 16). This role is particularly important due to the problems faced by 
new, initially small firms in obtaining necessary capital for growth. In fact, even the 
most advanced economies often lack financial institutions willing to either finance or 
support new entrants in the market.  
 
A comparison with the US market helps to substantiate this argument
5. In the 1980s 
and the 1990s, the U.S. saw a decline in the number of “independent financing outlets 
for business” and a shift in favour of larger banks. As a result of such change, several 
small enterprises have been excluded from financing and have been denied access to 
credit. To tackle this problem, a group of post-Keynesian economists argued for the 
establishment of the so-called “community development banks” (CDBs) with a set of 
well-defined goals: “one aim of the CDBs should be seek out projects that promise to 
be profitable but are not being financed because of their small size, their perceived 
riskiness, or the „inexperience‟ of the prospective management. Theory and evidence 
suggest that commercial banks are reluctant to make loans to firms that have not 
already  established  close  relations  with  a  loan  officer.  Thus,  firms  that  have  been 
denied access to credit due to perceived inexperience find it difficult to establish the 
required ties. This problem is aggravated when the firms are small and, hence, lack 
market  power”  (Minsky  et  al.,  1993,  11)
6. One should note that within the Italian 
                                                 
5The comparison is developed for illustrative purposes.  
6At the beginning of the 1990s, a proposal has been introduced for the creation of a network of community 
development banks, known as the “Clinton/Gore proposal”. Institutional reform of the financial structure of the 
U.S. economy was initially one of the priorities on President Clinton’s agenda.   9 
economy,  cooperative  credit  banks  perform  this  important  function.  Thereby,  they 
provide a valuable contribution to the national economy.  
 
In the next sections, I first develop a discussion on the competitive advantages of 
Italian cooperative credit banks. Subsequently, I attempt to provide an exhaustive list 
of the challenges faced by these banks.   
 
3.  Competitive advantages 
 
In  the  past,  it  is  argued,  cooperative  banks  flourished  because  they  managed  to 
effectively overcome important market imperfections. In the 19th century, two types 
of institutions emerged as a response to market inefficiencies: “savings banks” were 
established  from  the  1810-1815  onwards,  to  overcome  opportunistic  behaviour, 
rather  typical  of  commercial  banks  at  that  time;  on  the  other  hand,  “cooperative 
banks” were established from the mid-19th century onwards to overcome problems of 
opportunistic  behaviour  by  borrowers.  As  noted  by  Fontayne,  “within  small 
communities, relatively intimate knowledge of each other‟s credit- and trustworthiness 
ensured that loans were only provided to borrowers who could be expected to repay 
them…  Beyond  financial  incentives,  social  relations  among  members  were  also  a 
contributing  factor  to  the  success  of  cooperatives”  (Fontayne,  2007,  9).  The 
importance  attributed  to  social  relations  remains  a  distinctive  feature  for  many 
cooperative credit banks in Italy.  
 
3.1 Counter-cyclical behavior 
 
During  the  2007-2008  financial  crisis,  a  number  of  important  commercial  and 
investment banks as well as public banks (such as the “Landesbanken” in Germany) 
experienced financial distress. Furthermore, a number of former co-operative groups 
that  chose  to  demutualise,  for  instance  the  Northern  Rock  bank  and  Bradford  & 
Bingley in the UK, faced severe losses and have been exposed to a risk of failure. By 
reference to data provided by Bloomberg (October 2009), the top 25 financial players 
including groups such as Wachovia, Citi, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, UBS, HSBC, 
and the Royal Bank of Scotland accounted for almost 80% of the global costs of the 
crisis. By contrast, cooperative banks accounted for less than 3% of the total costs, 
and are therefore “hardly responsible for the direct costs of the crisis” (EACB, 2010, 
8-10). Costs suffered from the real economy are hard to quantify due to persistent 
problems such as relatively high levels of unemployment and declining growth in a 
number of industrial sectors.   
 
I  argue  that  the  cooperative  model  in  banking  is  prudential  and  safer  than  the 
business models generally applied by commercial and investment banks. If anything, 
problems  can  arise  as  a  consequence  of  a  demutualization  process  with  the 
subsequent  adoption  of  riskier  business  models.  As  an  aim  to  stimulate  scholarly 
debate,  it  is  useful  to  recall  the  fact that  a  number of differences  persist between 
cooperative  and  commercial  banks.  In  principle,  commercial  banks  tend  to  have  a 
more  aggressive  business  strategy,  as  shown  for instance  by higher  levels  of risk-  10 
taking and a strong emphasis on profitability, measured by ratios such as ROA, ROE, 
total  operative  costs,  cost-to-income  ratio,  recurring  earning  power.  By  contrast, 
cooperative  banks  tend  to  have  rather  conservative  business  policies:  they  often 
“pride  themselves  in  the  fact  that  they  are  not  profit  maximisers.  Instead,  their 
purpose  is  to  maximise  their  members‟  consumer  surplus,  and  this  may  be 
complemented by additional objectives that seek to contribute to the well-being of 
stakeholders other than member-consumers (e.g., employees)” (Fontayne, 2007, 19). 
In  times  of  financial  instability  resulting  from  –  among  others  –  an  increasing 
financialisation of the economy, they often act counter-cyclically.    
 
3.2 OTH model of intermediation: primacy to stakeholders 
 
Despite some significant developments in financial markets that took place in the last 
decades  as  a  result  of  the  financial  deregulation,  the  liberalisation  of  the  Italian 
banking market, and a rise in competition prompted by technological innovation, the 
cooperative model in banking has preserved its fundamental idiosyncrasies and can be 
best described as an “originate-to-hold” (OTH) model. Banks and financial institutions 
applying such  intermediation model to their business take  in deposits, and provide 
credit  and  financial  services  primarily  to  cooperative  members  (as  stated  in  their 
statute and in the 1993 Banking Act). They rely primarily on their members and are 
dependent  on  the  loyalty  of  retail  customers
7.  In  the  example  of  the  Ital ian 
cooperative credit banks, such customers are mainly individuals, households, and 
SMEs, particularly from the agricultural sector as well as non -profit organisations. To 
provide an example, in the third quartile of 2008, the market share in credit-provision 
and  financial  investments  was  directed  primarily  to  craft  enterprises  (21.6%), 
households for productive purposes (16.3%), households for consumption (9%), small 
enterprises from different sectors (16.1%), non-profit organisations (10.6%), and to 
non-financial enterprises (6.3%) 
8.  
 
According to Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), Italian cooperative credit banks operate in 
“market  niches”.  They  do  not  specialise  in  large,  risky  financial  investments  and 
transactions, and do not operate in the interbanking markets as much as commercial 
banks. Cooperative credit banks are well-equipped to overcome market failures due to 
their deep rooting in relationship banking, which enables them to develop tailor-made 
services and reduce asymmetries on borrowers. Their OTH intermediation model has 
long-term objectives and, as such, is “better suited to strengthen relationship banking 
and thus to favour responsible behaviour, in lieu of that irresponsible behaviour at the 
                                                 
7The same intermediation model is sometimes referred to as the “buy-and-hold” model. The alternative model is 
the so-called “originate-to-distribute” (OTD) model, which is rather frequent in banking: a fundamental 
difference consists in selling loans to third parties. In practice, it is argued, such model created several agency 
problems in which the “agents” (the originators of the loans) did not have proper incentives to fully act in the 
interest of the “principles” (final holders of loans). It has been applied extensively by banks for leveraging their 
comparative advantages in loan origination and “better” risk sharing with the rest of the economy. See: a) Allen 
F. and Carletti E. (2006), Credit Risk Transfer and Contagion, Journal of Monetary Economics, 53, 89-111; and b) 
Masera R. (ed.) (2009), The Great Financial Crisis, particularly pp. 84-85.   
8Data are available on www.creditocooperativo.it, in the “Statistics” section. Most recent data refer to 30 
September 2008. The original data are drawn from the Bank of Italy.    11 
origin of the crisis” (EACB, 2010, 17). Such model is consistent with the cooperative 
goal  to  maximise  stakeholders‟  value  rather  than  profits.  This  characteristic  has 
several  implications  for  economic  theory  and  for  the  design  of  policies  aimed  at 
economic development: a policy aimed at promoting cooperation is sensible at any 
time when the gain from mutual cooperation is higher than the losses faced by the 
single  players  that  are  willing  to  cooperate.  In  principle,  the  goal  of  maximising 
“stakeholders‟  value”    is  common  to  all  cooperative  enterprises.  Arguably,  such 
endeavour  makes  it  possible  to  (often)  fill  the  gap  between  the  “social”  and 
“economic” efficiency (Zamagni and Zamagni, 2008)
9. 
 
Although  fundamental  differences  can  be  observed  within  the  cooperative  credit 
systems across different European countries (Di Salvo, 2002), a standard governance 
and  business  model  applies  to  European  cooperative  banks,  including  the  Italian 
cooperative  credit  banks.  The  model  is  conceived  in  such  a  way  to  compete  on  a 
regional  and  a  national  level;  it could  hardly  compete  in  international markets.  By 
reference to Groeneveld and Sjauw-Koen-Fa (2009), one may argue that the model 
currently  shows  features  such  as:  (a)  a  corporate  governance  with  cooperative 
ownership; (b) a policy aimed at increasing the wealth of local communities (which 
encourages a cooperative attitude); (c) high levels of capitalisation; (d) stable levels 
of  profit;  (e)  a  rather  conservative  business  strategy  based  on  retail  banking;  (f) 
proximity to customers effectively managed through branch networking.   
 
3.3 Cooperative business philosophy 
 
A business philosophy that stresses the crucial contribution from social relations and 
trust  for  decreasing  uncertainty  and  for  channelling  capital  and  financial  surplus, 
remains a distinctive feature of several cooperative credit banks. By promoting a fair 
economy and sustainability in local economic growth, it translates into a successful 
market  strategy:  ideally,  success  shall  be  matched  by  social  progress  and  social 
justice.  These  features  add  substance  to  the  concept  of  “corporate  social 
responsibility”,  which  gained  prominence  and  is  being  viewed  increasingly  as  a 
measure of reliability in cooperative credit banks and social enterprises alike (Luciani 
and Tanno, 2009; Becchetti and Borzaga, 2010). Arguably, such a powerful concept 
could have been better exploited for marketing purposes by the Italian cooperative 
credit banks during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, to further increase competitiveness 
and  increase  their  market  share.  Evidence  from  empirical  analysis  suggests  that 
cooperatives gain prominence when markets and institutions fail to meet social and 
economic  needs.  This  occurs  with  frequency  in  times  of  financial  distress  and 
economic crisis (Brazda and Schediwy, 2001).    
 
                                                 
9The concept of “stakeholder value” – despite being subject to different interpretations – suffices to challenge the 
argument asserting that within modern enterprises, equity and efficiency tend to somewhat exclude each other. 
Such argument, advanced by the American economist Arthur M. Okun in his 1975 book Equality and Efficiency, 
the Big Trade-Off, suggests that there is a trade-off between them. Such a point of view is challenged by the fact 
that the dynamic efficiency of the economy increases with an equitable distribution of wealth; similarly, the 
dynamic efficiency of enterprises is a prerequisite for achieving better chances for economic mobility and 
equitable distribution of wealth.    12 
Cooperative credit banks, which to scholars may look like less attractive in times of 
financial stability, turn into interesting case-studies in times of financial distress. The 
“too big to fail” regulatory principle does not apply to these banks. Indeed, they are 
provided with internal safety nets that make them less exposed to the fragility of the 
financial system. Commercial banks often lack such safety nets, and – by contrast to 
cooperative  credit  banks  –  their  losses  are  to  be  often  covered  by  public  funds. 
Furthermore, research on data for the period from 2000 to 2006 shows that, from an 
operational  point  of  view,  small  financial  intermediaries  as  the  Italian  cooperative 
credit  banks  have  a  better  quality  of  the  loan  granting  process,  and  are  able  to 
implement more efficient recovery processes (Mattarocci and Gibilaro, 2008).  
 
Nonetheless, cooperative credit banks – like other financial institutions and financial 
intermediaries  –  may  occasionally  experience  distress  and  are  not  immune  from 
failure. As a result of the fact that the cooperative capital is variable, any cooperative 
bank can theoretically face a run on capital, for example in case that at a given time a 
large number of customers or cooperative members decided to withdraw from their 
membership. Italian cooperative credit banks are no exception to such problems, even 
though they rarely occur in practice. It is therefore crucial to list their weak points and 
suggest some essential improvements including better control mechanisms, a major 
degree of independence from local political parties, and improvements in the Human 
Resource (HR) management policy. 
 
4.  Challenges in the governance of cooperative credit banks 
 
4.1 Dispersed ownership 
 
Dispersed  ownership  is  typical  for  cooperative  banks,  particularly  for  cooperative 
credit banks. This suggests the fact that they face relatively high monitoring costs. 
Dispersed  ownership  lowers  the  probability  of  single  members  to  monitor  banking 
activities. Even though cooperative managers have lower incentives to undertake risky 
activities,  dispersed  ownership  may  not  adequately  support  the  establishment  of 
control  mechanisms  for  preventing  managerial  opportunism,  which  can  be  pursued 
even at the level of branch managers. By reference to Hansmann‟s (1996) insightful 
essay on the ownership of firms, it can be argued that managers could be tempted to 
use resources to engage in personal empire-building and to pursue interests different 
from  those  of  members  and  customers,  which  tend  to  be  risk-avers.  Opportunism 
limits trust-sharing and reciprocity among economic agents. It thus tends to impair 
cooperative behaviour.     
 
One should acknowledge that in recent decades, cooperative credit banks have lost 
some  of  their  original  competitive  advantages.  It  is  argued  that  much  of  the 
advantage in overcoming opportunistic behaviour by borrowers has been significantly 
eroded. The competitive disadvantages that commercial banks faced in the past have 
been  mostly  neutralised  due  to  the  improvement  in  legal  and  judicial  frameworks, 
which nowadays offer better enforceability of contracts. As a result of the liberalisation 
process in banking, the gap in the number of branches has gradually decreased, and   13 
the  market share  measured in terms  of  cooperative  branch  networks,  is  declining; 
furthermore, with the introduction of information technology and new technological 
devices in banking, branches themselves no longer provide the same advantage as 
they once did. Many of the proposals to improve the governance of cooperative banks 
have been impractical or ineffective (Cornforth, 2004; Finocchiaro, 2007; Fonteyne, 
2007).  
 
4.2 Reliance on cooperative members and local markets 
 
When evaluating competitive advantages of cooperative credit banks, one needs to 
take the opposite side of the coin into account. The fact that these banks have loyal 
customers  suggests  that  they  are  heavily  reliant  on  them.  This  does  not  always 
translate into new opportunities for business. What if they were unable to attract new 
customers, for instance those from emerging industrial settings? What if traditional 
customers  faced  losses  and  decreasing  competitiveness  on  the  market  and  their 
businesses? The fact that a large amount of scholarly research recently focused on 
Italy‟s stagnation and on lower growth rates compared to most other industrialised 
countries in Europe shows that these questions are indeed  relevant (Gallino, 2003; 
Daveri and Jona-Lasinio, 2005; Rossi, 2006; Ramazzotti, 2010; Vaciago, 2010, 46-
47). Furthermore, cooperative credit banks are themselves exposed to change, and 
need to develop their business so to meet new requirements and stay competitive on 
the market. According to Saccomanni (2007), the rationale for such change needs to 
be  properly  understood  and  adequately  managed.  Improvements  are  required  in 
terms  of  productivity,  as  well  as  with  regards  to  risk  management  through  –  for 
example  –  the  introduction  of  new  banking  technologies  and  new  procedures  in 
internal auditing. Compliance to new regulation is essential, as it is the enforcement of 
the existing safety net. 
 
Italian  cooperative  credit  banks  differ  in  terms  of  assets,  number  of  employees, 
location, historical background etc. As such, they need to build solid mutual relations 
to  increase  their  competitiveness  with  an  attempt  to  provide  local  solutions  to 
problems that are increasingly global. One of the potential drawbacks from belonging 
to  an  “alliance”  results  from  the  fact  that  some  counterparts  may  behave 
opportunistically  by  applying  risky  strategies  and  by  appropriating  part  of  the  rent 
generated  within  the  alliance.  In  fact,  in  the  economic  tradition  “cooperation”  is 
defined primarily as mutual cooperation between “self-oriented” actors (Moulin, 1995; 
Dardi, 2010). To paraphrase the French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1982, 98), it is 
rather “normal” that a given amount of speculation exists in banking. Further research 
is needed in order to shed light on the above-mentioned drawbacks and to provide 
guidelines on how to implement control mechanisms to detect similar problems and 
timely prevent them from occurring. An opportunistic behaviour of only a few such 
banks could have negative spillovers on the entire cooperative credit system.  
 
From  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  the  problem  of  network  (in)stability  is  frequently 
overlooked. As observed by Aldrich and Whetten (1984) it shall be addressed as an 
empirical question in scholarly research. Finally, close ties with local firms and local   14 
communities can be twofold as they include both advantages and disadvantages. By 
comparison  to  other  financial  intermediaries,  cooperative  credit  banks  may  suffer 
more  from  declining  industries  in  the  regions  where  they  operate,  and  from  the 
economic  depression  of  local  economies,  particularly  those  facing  increasing  global 
competition that may not be able to withstand such a competition in the long-run. As 
small banks that offer financial support to local communities, cooperative credit banks 
are strongly related to the “territory” and settings in which they operate, and depend 
on their socio-economic characteristics. This is particularly relevant for Italian banks 
due to the remarkable social, economic, and cultural differences that are characteristic 
of all Italian regions
10.  
 
4.3 (Too much) influence from politics? 
 
In Italy, a peculiar influence from politics on business and economic dynamics seems 
to  imply  that  the  governance  of  these  banks  may  sometimes  relate  to  political 
interests. In part, this problem has been addressed in an insightful paper by Sapienza 
(2004): results from her analysis show that the lending behaviour  of Italian banks 
(particularly state-owned banks) is affected by electoral results of the party affiliated 
with the banks. Specifically, the stronger the political party in the area where the firm 
is borrowing, the lower the interest rate charged. In principle, small banks are not 
immune  from  such  dynamics,  and  may  equally  suffer  from  them.  Perhaps  this 
problem is not limited to Italy. In Italy, however, it appears to be somewhat more 
pronounced than elsewhere. 
 
Influence and external pressure from politics can be ambiguous. They do not secure 
efficiency in financial markets nor at the level of individual financial intermediaries. 
Instead, they can lead to a misallocation of funds, and may thus impair the effective 
functioning of the markets. The importance of standard cooperative values such as 
“reciprocity” and “mutualism”  may decrease in terms of importance (Verrucoli, 1962; 
Bassi,  1976;  Venditti,  1995).  Arguably,  Italian  cooperative  credit  banks  are  not 
immune from such drawbacks and, as a result, some of them may take on higher 
risks and a higher financial exposure than normally required. The “Credito Cooperativo 
Fiorentino”, a cooperative credit bank based in Campi Bisenzio, Tuscany, which has 
recently undergone inquiry by the Bank of Italy, makes a good case-study. The bank 
has  been  investigated  due  to  risky  development  policies  and  a  significant  lack  of 
transparency in some major operations. As a result, its President, who is a member of 
an influential Italian political party, resigned. Subsequently, the CEO board resigned in 
July  2010.  The  bank  adopted  special  administration  procedures,  as  of  the  Italian 
banking law (Muchetti, 2010; Corriere della Sera, 15 August  2010).  
 
My aim here is not to comment on political issues: they go beyond the scope of the 
present paper. Instead, my aim is to stress the multifaceted “economic” implications 
resulting from the relation between Italian politics and the banking industry, and list 
                                                 
10It is useful to conceive territories in terms of abstract spaces of characteristics. A theoretical discussion on the 
relevance of the concept of territoriality for an analysis of cooperation can be found in: Axelrod R. (2006), The 
Evolution of Cooperation, particularly Chapter 8, “The Social Structure of Cooperation”, and on pp. 158-168.   15 
some of its potential side-effects on local banks. Although the investigation on the 
Credito Cooperativo Fiorentino is still in place and no conclusion has been reached so 
far, the example is telling of such a relation. Such example challenges the argument 
that economic organisations and financial institutions in advanced Western economies 
do not have to serve political interests (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986; North et al., 
2009); or, at least, it forces its reappraisal. It shows that local financial markets – 
even when it comes to cooperative banking – may be more-or-less influenced by local 
political parties. Party interests and political pressure could have a positive outcome 
only in case of a perfect and transparent political competition. These issues need to be 
addressed and analysed cum grano salis, possibly within an interdisciplinary research 
framework. 
 
The  above  discussion  suggests  that  political  and  private  economic  matters  should 
remain separate from banking activities so to prevent politics from exerting influence 
on the market equilibrium. On the other hand, effective regulation and supervision 
should prevent financial institutions from ineffectively exploiting the role that normally 
belongs to social policy (indeed, it is useful to recall the detrimental effects of private 
financing to low-income communities via the subprime loans, which can be viewed as 
a major cause of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, particularly in the US market). Such 
an argument  is  particularly relevant  for cooperative credit banks since,  by  its very 
nature,  their  business  model  is  based  on  a  responsible  (social  and  economic) 
behaviour.  
 
4.4 Human resource management and executive turnover 
 
A  responsible,  well-educated  management  with  planning  and  organising  skills  and 
leading  capabilities  is  essential  for  preserving  the  “intergenerational  endowment 
without owners”, which is characteristic to cooperative credit banks. By reference to 
the governance framework introduced earlier (Table 2 on page 4), it is clear that chief 
executives need to possess a sociological perspective to complement their expertise in 
finance  and  accounting.    Moreover,  executives  in  these  banks  need  to  commit 
themselves  to  fundamental  cooperative  values.  To  quote  from  Fonteyne,  “the  way 
cooperatives  were  designed  is  such  that  this  net  economic  value  is  in  essence  an 
owner-less intergenerational endowment that is available for use by current members, 
under the implicit or explicit understanding that they will grow it further and pass it on 
to the next generation of members. The managers of a cooperative have direct control 
over this endowment and can therefore be seen as its custodians” (Fonteyne, 2007, 
27).   
 
A  final  problem  faced  by  Italian  cooperative  credit  banks  refers  to  relatively  poor 
capabilities for HR management. This problem has been discussed in the past by an 
influential economist such as Alfred Marshall (1961). On the one hand, such problem 
can  be  addressed  from  a  perspective  focusing  on  “human  capital”  and  “knowledge 
management” (Giuli, 2001). On the other hand, it can be appraised by evaluating the 
effectiveness of the executive turnover as well as of related organisational procedures 
(Battistin et al., 2006; Tarantola, 2009, 10). Indeed, particularly in cooperative banks   16 
top executives‟ turnover appears to be influenced by local connections rather than by 
the bank‟s performance itself. As argued by a number of scholars, local connections 
have  a  particularly  strong  effect  in  mutual,  rural  and  cooperative  banks:  despite 
recognising that disciplining mechanisms are at work in most banks, connected top 
executives appear to have a lower turnover in such clusters of banks (Battistin et al., 
2006).  
 
Despite being in principle as flexible as commercial banks or more, small-sized banks 
can hardly afford a separate HR department, its own manager, and personnel qualified 
in HRM. Whether the cooperative credit network is provided with the adequate tools to 




This  paper  has  been  developed  with  an  aim  to  stimulate  discussion  on  Italian 
cooperative credit banks and, specifically, to point to the fact that cooperation is an 
important pillar for a stable economy. Italian cooperative credit banks are community 
banks that operate locally. They provide financial services to a variety of members 
and  are  particularly  efficient  in  addressing  customers‟  needs.  Their  activity  is 
complementary to that of commercial banks: their behaviour is counter-cyclical and 
often beneficial in terms of financial stability. It can be argued that such stability is 
essential  for  promoting  economic  development,  securing  social  order  and  social 
cohesion;  and  to  prevent  social  conflicts  resulting  from  high  unemployment,  rising 
poverty, and an unequal distribution of wealth (North et al., 2009). At a local level, 
cooperative  credit  banks  relate  to  entrepreneurial  clusters  and  industrial  districts. 
They provide capital and funding to newly-established enterprises, which is essential 
for  them  to  grow.  By  integrating  into  a  well-functioning  cooperative  network,  they 




th century, Italian cooperative credit banks maintain a set of well-defined 
characteristics.  Some  of  them  have  developed  into  a  number  of  competitive 
advantages, ranging from relationship banking and high customer loyalty to a sound 
policy for promoting corporate social responsibility. Despite increasing competition in 
the market, several advantages are retained at present. As it has been shown earlier, 
benefits result from: a) a governance based on cooperative ownership; b) a focus on 
retail banking; c) a traditional OTH intermediation model with inbuilt safety-nets; d) 
high solvency ratios; e) finally, a high level of capitalisation. In addition, new ones 
have emerged. Whether cooperative credit banks in Italy will be able to preserve their 
specifics in the long-term, is an open question. Will they succeed in increasing their 
market share? Will they tend to adopt more commercial strategies? Or, perhaps, will 
cooperation in banking gain prominence in the aftermath of the financial crisis? 
 
When  stimulated  and  properly  supervised,  such  a  banking  typology  contributes  to 
economic  development.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  I  acknowledged  that  the 
governance  in  cooperative  credit  banks  is  somewhat  impaired  by  a  number  of   17 
shortcomings that need to be adequately addressed and essentially improved in the 
coming years. As reported by Gutierrez (2008), there have been at least 20 cases of 
Italian cooperative banks with special administration procedures since year 2000. In 
the past, many of the proposals to improve the governance of cooperative banks have 
been impractical or ineffective. An effective mechanism for management control is still 
somewhat missing. Major challenges currently faced by the Italian cooperative credit 
banks  include:  a)  side-effects  resulting  from  a  heavy  reliance  on  cooperative 
members;  b)  side-effects  resulting  from  a  rather  strong  dependence  on  local 
economies and – to a minor extent – from parties‟ interests; c) organisational issues 
such as a HR management and recruitment policies that require major improvements.  
 
To conclude, a thorough investigation of cooperative banks and of their specifics can 
contribute  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  concept  of  “cooperation”  in  banking. 
Despite increasing attention from social economists as well as from institutions such 
as the Bank of Italy and the IMF
11, their implications for improving  financial policies 
remain  in  part  unaccounted  for.  New  insights  cou ld  possibly  translate  into 
improvements in regulatory frameworks which are much needed in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. A better recognition of the specifics listed above and their business 
philosophy would be particularly beneficial. Whereas in t he past the international 
regulatory framework has been designed with mainly commercial banks in mind  – as 
is  shown  for  instance  by  the  third  pillar  of  the  Basel  II  Agreement  –,  recent 
developments in financial markets force regulators and policy-makers to take specifics 
from different banking typologies into equal account.  
 
Banks are normally heavily regulated. Cooperative credit banks are among the most 
regulated financial intermediaries. Ineffective government regulations and insufficient 
supervision from financial authorities can “adversely distort the behaviour of bankers 
and inhibit standard corporate governance processes” (Levine, 2004, 3). An in-depth 
understanding of cooperative credit banks (as well as popular banks, credit unions and 
local  community  banks),  can  contribute  to  improving  the  current  regulatory 
framework from a qualitative point of view. As shown by some examples of failures in 
the past, despite applying to rather conservative policies and despite integrating into a 
sound credit network, these banks are not immune from mismanagement, potential 
runs on capital and subsequent failures. By properly addressing these shortcomings, 
both executives in Italian cooperative banks and financial regulators will be able to 
increase the reliability of cooperative credit banks and further increase their positive 
contribution to sustainable economic development.    
 
                                                 
11Consider for instance the below-referenced papers, in the References section.   18 
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